

DRAFT TELEGRAM

39

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ACTION: USUN, New York

Re: New York's 1456.

Believe Brazilian proposal offers possibilities helpful in current Cuban situation. It appears to Department that of various alternatives open for disposal problem created by build-up Soviet offensive arms in Cuba, this perhaps most attractive and feasible for following reasons.

(a) Assuming Communists will be willing abandon use of Cuba as a nuclear base in face our pressures without requiring quid pro quo from us, which is our present negotiating position, proposal for LA denuclearized zone would offer attractive face-saving way out for Communist camp; this particularly true since present proposal is bona fide LA initiative, and Cuba could accept on grounds they deferring to wishes of LA neighbors to make entire area nuclear free zone to which they wish contribute as gesture desire to return to more normal situation in area (latter concept espoused in UAR-Ghana draft resolution). Since such arrangement would constitute voluntary Cuban association with LA initiative, Cubans could play positive response as completely divorced from US pressure. Moreover, USSR itself in this way could be removed one step from process and would not be required abandon Cuba as missile base except in terms of response to requests from Cuban Government.

(b) This approach avoids need for us to enter direct negotiations with the Communists in which we would confront them with categorical demand for

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By vmg NARS, Date 5/9/77

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dismantling missile installations in Cuba.

(c) Such outcome has chance of being widely regarded in world opinion as positive development (to which our action on Cuba would clearly have contributed) in an aspect of disarmament which is extremely attractive to large part of world. Such outcome would appear positive and constructive solution, not only in eyes foreign public opinion, but should be seen domestically as acceptable outcome of Cuban crisis since our fundamental objective would have been achieved.

(d) Denuclearization arrangements in Africa and Latin America consistent with long-term national security interests of US. FYI. We see some tactical advantage in treating questions African and LA zones together for time being, since enthusiasm for one will assist in building support for other. However, for US, acceptability of one would not need be dependent upon both being put into effect. END FYI.

US Del should be guided by following points in any discussions with Brazilians re resolution contained refel:

1. US would in principle favor denuclearized arrangements both in Africa and Latin America if such arrangements worked out and agreed to by the states in those areas. We believe, as Brazilians do, that arrangements should include adequate verification to assure all states in area of compliance. FYI. The US, of course, assumes and desires that other Latin American countries would agree to form such a zone only if effective Cuban participation were assured. END FYI.

2. US believes any arrangements for denuclearized zones should be

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-3-

determined by the countries of the region. We would therefore not support action by Security Council or GA which appeared to impose such arrangements or to dictate their character. US hopes Brazilians would agree with this concept and consider alterations in their draft. Resolution contained reftel places SC in position of calling upon member states in effect to treat continents as demuclearized in absence agreement on part states concerned rather than to cooperate with arrangements reached. Furthermore, it places SC in position of imposing committee to deal with suggestion on states concerned.

3. US would be prepared to declare its willingness to cooperate with arrangements worked out by all the states in the areas concerned.

We do not believe we should get into any detailed discussions in precise language of Brazilian text. However, US Del might say that we would vote in favor of any resolution consistent with above points. We would be prepared to vote for resolution which endorsed establishment committee agreed by states concerned, and we would also be prepared to support call upon SYG to lend his good offices on request of states concerned.

You should also indicate we would like move ahead rapidly on this front. At same time, we have several major problems with language in present text and hope Brazil will rework draft quickly to meet basic points described above and discuss with us again soonest.

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DRAFT FOLLOWS

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(a) Assuming Communists will be willing abandon use of Cuba as a nuclear base in face our pressures without requiring quid pro quo from us, which is our basic objective, proposal for LA demuclearized zone should offer attractive face-saving way out for Communist camp; this particularly true since present proposal is bona fide LA initiative, and Cuba could accept on grounds they deferring to wishes of LA neighbors to make entire area nuclear free zone to which they wish contribute as gesture desire to return to more normal situation in area (latter concept espoused in UAR-Ghana draft resolution). Since such arrangement would constitute voluntary Cuban association with LA initiative, Cubans could play positive response as completely divorced from US pressure. Moreover, USSR itself in this way could be removed one step from process and would not be required abandon Cuba as missile base except in terms of response to requests from Cuban government.

(b) This approach equally attractive to us and Soviets since it would avoid need for us to enter negotiations with the Communists in which we would be required confront them with categorical demand for dismantling missile installations in Cuba;

(c) Such outcome should be widely regarded in world opinion as positive development (to which our action on Cuba would clearly have contributed) in an

/aspect of

ADMS CONTROL DISARMAMENT AGENCY
 Release () Declassify () Date 10/1/80
 () Exempt () Declassify () Date 8-7-89
 () Exempt () Declassify () Date 8-7-89

aspect of disarmament which is extremely attractive to large part of world. Such outcome would appear positive and constructive solution, not only in eyes foreign public opinion, but should be seen domestically as acceptable outcome of Cuban crisis since our fundamental objective would have been achieved.

(d) Demuclearisation arrangements in Africa and Latin America consistent with long-term national security interests of US. Also believe Latin American zone could be considered separate from African demuclearized zones.

US Del should be guided by following points in any discussions with Brazilians re resolution contained refel:

1. US would in principle favor demuclearized arrangements both in Africa and Latin America if such arrangements worked out and agreed to by ~~all~~ ^{ALL} states in those areas. We believe, as Brazilians apparently do, that arrangements should include adequate verification to assure all states in area of compliance.
2. US believes any arrangements for demuclearized zones should be of a voluntary character and could not support action by Security Council or GA which appeared to impose such arrangements or to dictate their character. US hopes Brazilians would agree with this concept and consider alterations in their draft. Resolution contained refel places SC in position of calling upon member states in effect to treat continents as demuclearized in absence agreement on part states concerned rather than to cooperate with arrangements reached. Furthermore it places SC in position of imposing committee to deal with suggestion or states concerned.

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/arrangements

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We do not believe we should get into any detailed discussions in precise language of Brazilian text. However, US Del might say that we would vote in favor of any resolution consistent with above points. We would be prepared to vote for resolution which endorsed establishment committee agreed by states concerned and we would also be prepared to support call upon ST to lend his good offices on request of states concerned.

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IO - Harlan Cleveland

ACDA - Mr. Foster

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